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Abstract 
 
The article argues that ‘moderate postmodernism’ can in certain 
respects be reconciled with a methodological practice, triangulation, 
that is based on main- stream methodological  foundations.  A 
connection is made between moderate postmodernism and 
triangulation’s  orientation to multiple  methods. The evolution  of 
social science approaches to triangulation  towards a position  less 
concerned with  convergent validation  and more concerned with  
using  multiple methods to create greater analytic density and 
conceptual richness facilitates a conciliation  between postmodernism  
and triangulation.  The argument is illustrated by contemporary 
empirical examples. 
 
 
 
 
The familiar expression comprising the article’s main title is sometimes rep- 
resented by a cartoon image in which one character tries to escape the others 
by going up a tree and onto one of the branches. When they come up the tree 
the character decides to saw off the branch so the others cannot climb onto it. 
Unfortunately, since the character is still sitting on the branch, when it is sawn 
off the character promptly falls down into the arms of the pursuers. There are 
two ways in which this article is about going out on a limb. First, the expres- 
sion is about going too far, a charge made against postmodernism. Second, 
the article goes out on a limb, because it argues that elements of the method- 
ological position associated with (moderate) postmodernism can be recon- 
ciled with a methodological practice, ‘triangulation’ (or multi-method 
research), which is based on mainstream methodological foundations. That 
is, there may be common ground between two positions that are conven- 
tionally treated as antithetical. The ‘common ground’  is modest but could 
provide  one pole  of reconciliation  to help  sociology  produce cumulative 
social knowledge. 
 
 
There has always been a tension in multiple method research between 
the flexibility required to provide openings for the integration of multiple 
methods, and the impetus to lay down systematic procedures to effect such 
an integration with rigour. The case of the relationship between postmod- 
ernism and multiple method research helps us to recognize this tension. 
The canonical statement of triangulation was Campbell and Fiske’s (1959) 
‘multi-trait, multi-method matrix’, a highly systematic model whose com- 
ponents and procedures suggested a preoccupation  with taming  rather 
than exploiting the tendency of methods in combination to produce incom- 
mensurate, puzzling or contradictory findings. To equally overdraw  the 
case, whereas postmodernism has often been received as a nihilism that 
 implies that, in the absence of agreed epistemological standards, anything 
goes, its epistemology can alternatively be read as erecting such stringent 
standards for demonstrable, agreed knowledge that ‘nothing goes’, where 
‘nothing’ means ‘conventional methodology’. Both the characterization of 
triangulation and of postmodernism are further  discussed later. For now 
the point is that at an epistemological and a procedural level, both positions 
make play with conceptions of flexibility and systematicity. 
 
This article argues that the relationship  of multiple  method research 
and postmodernism illustrates that it is possible to have rigour without 
rigidity.  It suggests that moderate postmodernism and methodological 
triangulation  come together in their common emphasis on the value of 
documenting multiple  perspectives. Incorporating elements of postmod- 
ernist perspectives in mixed method research can help researchers engage 
with  the complexity of social phenomena, and the engagement of post- 
modernists with mixed method research can encourage a recognition that 
some of the epistemological concerns highlighted  by postmodernism are 
thoughtfully negotiated by mainstream sociology. 
 
While extreme formulations of postmodernism repudiate the notion of 
method, moderate variants do orientate to empirical work, and indeed 
postmodernism  is  particularly  associated  with methods such as decon- 
structionism. Extreme postmodernism may simply paralyse enquiry, but 
‘affirmative postmodernism’ is not necessarily averse to cumulative knowl- 
edge (Rosenau, 1992). It has deep doubts about methodological assump- 
tions  but  does not  regard them as insuperable,  and in fields  like  the 
sociologies of technology and of everyday life, postmodernist work builds 
on previous postmodernist and non-postmodernist work (Wakeford, 2004). 
In that postmodernist perspectives increasingly inform empirical research, 
it is worth considering means by which such work might contribute to col- 
lective sociological endeavour. 
 
It is not intended to address all of postmodernism’s tenets or concerns, 
but to explore how postmodernism’s analytic organization around a decen- 
tred subject may inform a methodological  posture of valuing multiple  
perspectives.  Insofar as it does, there is  a connection  with mainstream 
thinking in respect of multiple method research. To indicate the space such 
a connection occupies, a comment on rationales for multiple method 
research is required. Early rationales were cast in terms of ‘triangulation’, a 
term suggesting the precision and fixity associated with land surveying 
that has proven elusive in sociology. 
 
Social science triangulation  was originally  developed in the context of 
psychology (Campbell and Fiske, 1959) and is prominent in the theory of 
method associated with  post-positivism (Campbell and Russo, 1999). Its 
premise was that validity,  understood as agreement in the outcomes of 
more than one independent measurement procedure, was enhanced rela- 
tive to studies employing a single procedure. The approach requires that 
there are realities that exist independently of the observer, that have sta- 
ble properties that can be measured and that can be related together as the 
 basis of internally  consistent explanations of social phenomena. Such 
tenets provide a necessary basis for triangulation because it seeks to relate 
findings from different methods, and to do this it assumes that variations 
in findings arise from the phenomenon or the particularities of the meth- 
ods being combined rather than methods haphazardly producing differ- 
ent findings on different occasions, or there being no predictable 
consistencies in how given methods work. The latter is especially impor- 
tant in the convergent validation  approach to triangulation,  as it is 
premised on the combined methods having different and distinctive 
biases; if methods are susceptible to the same biases, combining them may 
simply multiply error (Fielding and Fielding, 1986). It is in this sense that 
Levins’ (1966: 423) declaration that ‘our truth is the intersection of inde- 
pendent lies’ is so apt. 
 
Thus,  the  doctrine  of  convergent  validation  requires  agreement 
of results from diverse but systematic uses of methods, data sources, theo- 
ries  and  investigators  (Denzin,  1989). An  abiding  criticism  of  this 
approach is that triangulation cannot be a validation strategy where dif- 
ferent ontological and epistemological assumptions underpin the meth- 
ods in combination (Blaikie, 1991). Combining methods or drawing on 
different data sources only enhance validity where each is associated with 
cognate ontological and epistemological perspectives. Post-positivists 
have diluted the original doctrine of convergent validation, sidestepping 
the ontological/epistemological critique with the argument that datasets 
are open to interpretation from a range of theories. Another response to 
the critique is that combining different methodologies and interpreta- 
tions does not necessarily enhance validity but can extend the scope and 
depth  of  understanding  (Denzin  and  Lincoln,  2000; Fielding  and 
Fielding, 1986; Fielding and Schreier, 2001). Such a position informs the 
present argument. 
 
 
Postmodernism and Interpretive Adequacy 
 
 
Postmodernism is a contested school of thought. Rosenau (1992: 15) differ- 
entiates two broad orientations, the ‘sceptical’ postmodernists, who assert 
the ‘impossibility of truth’, and the ‘affirmative’ postmodernists. The ‘affir- 
mative’ postmodernist has a more positive worldview, an orientation to 
process, and ‘a philosophical and ontological practice that is nondogmatic, 
tentative, and nonideological’ (Rosenau, 1992: 16). While the sceptical post- 
modernists hold as a central tenet the death of the subject (as in the subject/ 
object distinction), ‘affirmatives’ believe it is not necessary to eliminate the 
concept of a subject to be cautious about generalization and a unified frame 
of reference. Rosenau’s is not the only view on the differentiation of per- 
spectives within postmodernism but it does help us to identify degrees of 
radicalism concerning empirical scepticism. At its least radical, where 
decentring the subject is construed simply in terms of perspectival rela- 
tivism, postmodernism is on common ground  with some of the earliest 
positivist approaches to qualitative methodology, a point pursued later on. 
 
  
Rosenau (1992) is not alone in differentiating strong and moderate forms 
of postmodernism.  McRobbie  (1994) identifies  a bifurcation  between a 
postmodernism of the arts whose tokens were a concern with image and 
the ironic  reworking  of classical  artistic  themes, and a postmodernism 
revolving around an anti-foundationalist critique of social theory whose 
business was to reveal the oppressive metanarratives under which modern 
social thought had emerged, derived from Lyotard’s idea that ‘the science 
which  promised  knowledge  of and mastery over nature was part of a 
much bigger story of conquest, decimation and militarisation’ (McRobbie, 
1994: 5). Lyotard’s position is associated with a wariness of ‘the big pic- 
ture’. McRobbie observes that this ‘means being attentive to the assump- 
tions  which  shape social  theory,  the  criteria  which  it uses, .  .  .  to 
boundary-marking, and to what exactly is being excluded from or 
included in the fields of knowledge’ (McRobbie, 1994: 5). Allied with post- 
modernism’s interest in difference and ‘local images of postmodern soci- 
ety as a fragmented and diverse social reality’ (Turner, 2004), these are the 
parts of the postmodern canon of most interest to a project seeking con- 
nections between postmodernism and mainstream methodological 
debates. The concern with what Laclau (1991) called the ‘radical incom- 
mensurability’ of divisions like age, sex, nation, ethnicity and class feeds 
postmodernism’s insistence on the elusiveness of a unitary vision. Laclau 
meant the point politically – his target being post-Marxism – but the exten- 
sion to sociology is clear enough. An exploration of difference threatens 
claims to generic or axiomatic understanding and complicates generaliza- 
tion. In  a feminist  context, Spivak  (1988) offers the example  of black 
women, for whom the women’s movement, a product of modernity, does 
not speak. The postmodernist criticizes the foundations that secure the 
idea  of a single  womanhood, insisting  that analysis  accommodates the 
view of those who dispute the terms in which they are represented. Here 
the ideas of decentring, deconstruction and relativism are closely allied. 
 
While Rosenau’s sceptical postmodernists repudiate generalized theory 
and objective truth, ‘affirmatives’  simply question the truth claims of the- 
ory and the assertion of privileged status for sociological understandings 
of society. There is a focus on everyday life, and ‘the daily  life  focus, 
empiricist  in character, would  emphasise concrete reality  . . . [and]  is 
offered as a basis of generalizable statements’ (Rosenau, 1992: 16). Such 
formulations are not unlike conventional statements of qualitative sociol- 
ogy in preferring a reflexive to a positivist epistemology, being dubious of 
claims to objectivity  and valuing  difference over similarity.  Naturally, 
these positions challenge an epistemology that both assumes an inde- 
pendent reality  and that it can be directly  and unproblematically  per- 
ceived, but it  is important  to acknowledge that such challenges were 
mounted long before postmodernism and that even if they see knowledge 
as organized around personal, intuitive concerns or as marking particular 
epistemological assumptions, moderate postmodernists implicitly accept 
that a knowledge is possible. 
 
 
  
The ‘affirmatives’ hold a constructivist theory of reality. The very concept 
of reality construction implies that some accounts are valid and others are 
not (Edelman, 1988), a position that necessarily constrains relativism. For 
example,  postmodernists  share a radical  critique  of modernity,  whereby 
Enlightenment  understandings  of reason and even equality  are read as 
forms of domination; as McRobbie (1994: 8) neatly puts it, ‘to enlighten some 
was to regulate many others’. However, ‘this kind of questioning . . . need 
not mean the abandonment of all reason; instead it asks after the construc- 
tion of reason or reality.’ Moderate approaches engage with different subjec- 
tivities, pointing out, for example, that black women do not read patriarchy 
as do white women and young women do not read the feminism/ 
femininity dualism as do women who experienced the adversities of the 
early women’s movement; ‘we have to attend to the inventiveness of 
women as they create new social categories’. The methodological indication 
is that postmodernism is interested in complex, dynamic categories. A soci- 
ology that wants to capture the contemporary in matters such as social 
identity, cultural affiliation, political disaffection and deviant behaviour 
needs methodologies that can register a richer variety of perspectives. 
 
Moreover, the belief  in ‘intertextuality’  (the connection  of everything 
with everything) that problematizes causal explanation for postmodernists 
can plausibly be read as no more than an insistence that causal explanation 
of social phenomena is complex. Postmodernists have asserted the diffi- 
culty in establishing the temporal priority that is a precondition of causal 
explanation in a social world where everything is related in an absolutely 
interactive way (Tyler, 1986), but engagement with that kind of temporal 
complexity has long been the business of systems theory (Buckley, 1967) 
and is at the heart of Archer’s (1982) concept of ‘morphogenesis’. The effect 
may be to ‘multiply’ complexity but the position can also be read as an 
attempt to identify  methods that better address complexity:  ‘postmod- 
ernism is oriented toward  methods that apply to a broad range of phe- 
nomena, focus on the margins, highlight uniqueness, concentrate on the 
enigmatic’ (Rosenau, 1992: 117). 
 
As Kvale (1995: 21) suggests, while moderate postmodernists may reject 
the possibility of objectivity and axiomatic knowledge they do acknowl- 
edge both obdurate social realities and ‘specific, local, personal and com- 
munity forms of truth’.  Arguing that obdurate social realities cannot be 
directly represented does not preclude assessing pragmatically or conse- 
quentially the relative validity of different empirical analyses. The con- 
cerns raised under this rubric by postmodernists are consistent with those 
raised from the earliest days in qualitative methodology, covering such 
matters as the relationship of research to its social and political context 
(Bogardus, 1924; Ervin-Tripp, 1967; Rice, 1929), the location of research in 
its own micro-history and the development of the observed phenomenon 
at the time of the research intervention (Riesman and Benney, 1955; Wax 
and Shapiro, 1956; Whyte, 1953), and the multidimensional and sometimes 
ambiguous character of social reality (Becker, 1956; Dean and Whyte, 1958; 
Lazarsfeld, 1944). If these concerns are as alien as is suggested by the more 
 trenchant critics of postmodernism their target cannot be postmodernism 
but the canons of qualitative methodology itself. 
 
Postmodernism is simply  the most recent approach seeking to revisit 
assumptions behind established methods and criteria of validity.  It high- 
lights the extent to which questions of validity are tied to the ways that 
research questions, research designs, methodological procedures and the 
conceptualization of findings are contingent on the approaches of 
researchers. Decisions at each stage of enquiry represent a framing of real- 
ity. Some regard this long-standing perspective as indicating the need to 
reconstitute the disciplines of social research (Clifford,  1986: 2) and have 
drawn deeply on textual criticism, cultural history, semiotics and the tech- 
niques of the dramatist and poet in an effort to revise social research, 
especially ethnography, which is seen as ‘always caught up in the inven- 
tion, not the representation, of cultures’. 
 
However, scepticism about assumptions underlying research methods is 
hardly the monopoly of postmodernists (e.g. Burawoy, 2000). Perhaps the 
most elaborated  debate is  over the status of interview  data. McRobbie 
(1994: 180) claims that sociology has treated interview data ‘as transpar- 
ently meaningful and as evidence in themselves, rather than as complex 
social  constructs which  are the products  of pre-given  discourses’.  One 
might take this as demonstrating the need for conciliation between post- 
modernism and the mainstream, since the latter anticipated McRobbie’s 
claim by at least two decades. Lyman and Scott’s (1970) view of interview 
data as ‘accounts’, Cicourel’s (1982) treatment of interview data as product 
of a ritual interaction and Holstein and Gubrium’s reflexive conception of 
the relationship between validation and pre-theoretical orientations to 
empirical  reality  (Brekhus  et  al.,  2005; Gubrium  and  Holstein,  1997; 
Holstein and Gubrium, 1995) are instances of non-postmodernist moves to 
treat interview (and other qualitative) data as topic rather than resource. 
However, these treatments do not conclude that, because the status of inter- 
view data can be questioned, such data are meaningless. Classic engage- 
ments  like  Deutscher (1973) accommodate epistemological  concerns 
through careful research design and alertness to threats to validity during 
operationalization. Thus, while many question the status of interview and 
observational data, the fact that fieldwork cannot be regarded as a commu- 
nicative conduit tapping directly into empirical information and that it car- 
ries implicit theories of social reality does not mean that the ontological 
status of field data affords researchers no analytic purchase at all. 
 
Attempts to negotiate a via media between naive objectivism and crude 
relativism precede ‘moderate postmodernism’, despite the postmodernist 
tendency to draw a straight line from Enlightenment ‘hyper-rationalism’ 
to contemporary mainstream thinking  (Southgate, 2003). This bypasses, 
for example, Weber ’s position on objectivity, with  its moderate perspec- 
tivism, the mediated approach to social reality based on community stan- 
dards of validity found in contemporary hermeneutics (Bernstein, 1983), 
and current debates over the relationship between findings from survey 
research and interpretive  sociology, such as Williams’  (2000) work  on 
 ‘moderatum  generalisation’. The argument is not that postmodernism 
innovates in its critique of objectivism and rationalism, or is more per- 
ceptive than earlier efforts. Indeed, the distinctive accommodations 
between objectivism, rationalism and relativism offered by Weber, sym- 
bolic interactionism,  phenomenology and hermeneutics, may be more 
helpful to research practice in that they more vigorously cast problems of 
subjectivity as susceptible to self-monitoring by researchers. 
 
Nevertheless, postmodernism’s orientation to multiple perspectives does 
provide a bridgehead to a key element of mainstream methodology and 
thus a means of communication across the divide. Moreover, there is more 
to postmodernism  than openness to multiple  perspectives.  Postmoder- 
nism’s orientation to multiple perspectives is connected with the position 
that research is never entirely disinterested and thus empirical phenomena 
can be differently understood for reasons independent of the phenomenon 
itself. When validity is defined in terms of consensus within a research 
community, such a position alerts us that values and interests lie behind the 
consensus. However, it is possible to acknowledge such postmodernist con- 
cerns without abandoning reliability and validity or being unable to adju- 
dicate between methods as they are applied in given cases. Altheide and 
Johnson (1994: 290) argue that, while postmodernist concerns call for crite- 
ria that acknowledge competing perspectives, they do not negate a concern 
with validity. One approach is Denzin and Lincoln’s (1994: 14) endorsement 
of ‘credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability [to] replace 
the . . . positivist criteria of internal and external validity, reliability and 
objectivity’. Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) have gone furthest in advocating 
validity criteria specific to mixed methods research in their notion of ‘infer- 
ence quality’, which essentially combines internal validity with standards 
of trustworthiness and credibility but downplays external validity/ 
transferability (Bryman, 2006). These commentaries are largely sympathetic 
to postmodernist-type concerns but insist that validity criteria are primarily 
informed  by the particularities  of given  methods. Even in postmodern 
ethnography, ‘practitioners recognise that all methods impose perspectives 
on reality by the type of data that they collect, and each tends to reveal 
something slightly  different  about the same “symbolic”  reality’ (Brewer, 
2000: 76; emphasis added). One cannot argue that  different  methods 
apply different  frames of reference to the same empirical phenomenon 
without  also accepting that there is a stable, if multifaceted, phenomenon 
to which researchers are applying different methods. 
 
Thus, capturing multiple perspectives and interpretations is one criterion 
for evaluating research, but many otherwise sympathetic commentaries on 
postmodernism agree that it is counter-productive when taken too far. The 
fear many have of postmodernism is ‘that of . . . excessive skepticism, and 
of a paralysing relativism – of a crossing of limits beyond which “anything 
goes” ’ (Marcus, 1994: 403). Unrestrained relativism not only embraces mul- 
tiple perspectives but declines to differentiate between contradictory per- 
spectives. However, decentring the subject does not necessarily make for 
absolute relativism. Postmodernist empirical work may sometimes take the 
form of demonstrating that using a multiplicity of methods produces dif- 
 ferent results, but this does not mean it is unable to arbitrate between them. 
As Williams (2000: 220) observes, ‘a generalising statement . . . about the 
design of fruit machines is more dependable than a statement about the 
players’ strategies, which in its turn is more dependable than (say) state- 
ments about “trust regarding money” amongst the players’. The statements 
share an objective probability of zero but this does not justify assigning the 
same status to inferences drawn from each statement. Acknowledging that 
there are multiple  perspectives  need not mean that all  perspectives  are 
equal. It is only at the extreme that caution about arbitration is replaced by 
refusal to accept that contradictory accounts can be weighed and evaluated 
(Hammersley, 1992). Such epistemological relativism is solipsistic, its effect 
being  to prevent  researchers engaging  with difference  (Boudon, 2004). 
However, this is not the position of all postmodernists, whereas a common 
thread is certainly that multiple perspectives must be acknowledged and 
that sociologists have no privileged insight into the valid explanation of 
social phenomena. 
 
 
Connecting Postmodernism and Triangulation 
 
The connection between moderate postmodernism’s emphasis on the need 
to reflect different constructions of social reality and the practice of method- 
ological triangulation is that incorporating multiple perspectives helps us 
look at the research issue from ‘all angles’. If we take account of a range of 
interpretations we maximize the elements of the phenomenon that are 
exposed to  analysis.  Triangulation  encourages researchers not  only to 
acknowledge multiple perspectives but to relate them analytically. 
Addressing empirical phenomena from a single perspective, employing a 
single explanatory variable or relying on a single method result in compart- 
mentalization  of analysis  (Sokal  and Bricmont,  1998). By using  research 
designs that employ different methods to capture different aspects of the 
phenomenon, drawing samples purposively so as to contrast the perspec- 
tives of different groups and so on, multiple method research can act as a 
corrective to analytic tunnel vision. It is a way to achieve ‘analytic density’. 
 
Classical triangulation for convergent validation is, unsurprisingly, taken 
as implying there is one ‘right answer’. However, in practice, studies pursu- 
ing convergent validation often reach conclusions that place different factors 
or variables in proportion, accounting for different amounts of variance, or 
that suggest that methods such as surveys and field observation expose 
related but distinct ‘dimensions’ of the phenomenon. Moreover, convergent 
validation is but one model for multiple method research. Kelle (2001) sug- 
gests three models:  (1) triangulation as the mutual validation of results 
obtained using different methods (the validity model); (2) triangulation to 
obtain a fuller picture of the phenomenon (the complementarity model); and 
(3) triangulation in its original land-surveying sense, where methods must 
be combined to locate the phenomenon at all (the trigonometry model). The 
present argument develops Kelle’s second model. In philosophy, the classic 
account is  Lesniewski’s  (1992) demonstration  that  multiple  conceptual 
schemes can be used to describe the same reality. To argue for multiple per- 
spectives is not to preclude the possibility of a single, empirically adequate 
 understanding but to emphasize that, while there may ultimately be only one 
adequate perspective, we need multifaceted sources of data to develop it. 
Importantly, Kelle also argues that triangulation on its own cannot solve 
analytic puzzles. It has to be informed by theory. 
 
Endorsing triangulation as a means to access a richer array of perspectives 
and factors does not mean that any new information automatically adds ana- 
lytic density. Consistent with hermeneutics, contributing to analytic density 
requires orientation to the empirical and analytic deficits left by previous con- 
tributions. Gadamer (1975) emphasizes participation in the collective endeav- 
our from which community constructions of knowledge emerge. Dialogue 
between differently committed minds enables progressive refinement of 
understandings. Healy (2005), in formulating an account of rationality com- 
mensurate with contemporary postfoundationalist thinking and pluralistic 
intellectual communities, advances a dialogical approach to rationality as a 
way to address paradigm disputes between positivism and interpretivism. 
The construction of ‘analytic density’ is here intended as greater degrees of 
hermeneutic  elaboration.  Enhanced analytic  density  does not necessarily 
presage enhanced certainty. The benefit of triangulation may not so much be 
that it enables researchers to demonstrate that their findings mutually rein- 
force each other but that it ‘give[s] different viewpoints the chance to arise, 
and postpone[s] the immediate rejection of information or hypotheses that 
seem out of joint with the majority viewpoint’ (Trend, 1978: 353). 
 
Indeed,  multiple  method  enquiry  may  challenge  the  researcher ’s 
assumptions and the precepts animating the enquiry in ways that are con- 
sonant with postmodernism but that arise empirically rather than being 
taken as a given. Commendations of multiple method research tend to fix 
on the outcome of the process, the knowledge that results when the jigsaw 
puzzle has come together. Less remarked are the unsettling steps along the 
way. A researcher who  engages with accountants’ job satisfaction  may 
begin by assuming that ‘job satisfaction’ is a tangible object of study, but 
become less certain as her or his awareness grows of competing conceptu- 
alizations. The researcher may find that the cultural significance imputed 
to the phenomenon does not register with research participants, or that the 
indicators taken as signs of the phenomenon are so extensively mediated 
that ‘sign’ cannot be distinguished from ‘noise’. The fact that self-reflexive 
engagement with multiple method research can lead researchers to ques- 
tion the very focus of a study, and open a normatively oriented ‘research 
problem’ to reformulation and even repudiation, in a similar way to the 
heuristic offered by postmodernism, is a story less often told. The process 
by which the ‘research problem’ is itself problematized is likely to be more 
complex and unsettling than any linear progress from theory to hypothe- 
sis, data collection and findings. It may require the researcher to consider 
whether the research problem is actually a normatively based construction 
behind which sits a more profound social phenomenon (as in Grey’s [1994] 
postmodernist analysis of accountants’ careers). Thus, the researcher who 
engages with accountants’ careers may be led to accept neither member- 
validated accounts of the pleasures of calculation nor the construction of 
 
  
‘career’ as a form of déformation professionelle, but come to see the concept 
of career as a story that professionals tell themselves to counter the sense 
of contingency arising from the evidence daily before them of the risks 
posed by market economies. 
 
Whether engendered  as a starting assumption, as in postmodernism, or 
provoked by confrontation with  challenging empirical data, as in mixed 
method research, the impetus towards analytic density is a productive 
scepticism. It is sceptical in its alertness to the points of weakness in given 
methods, sampling strategies and analytic  strategies, and in exercising 
caution whenever generalization is attempted, but it is productive in 
demanding rigour,  the making  explicit  of assumptions and in seeking 
analyses that explicitly  negotiate the basis for, and limits of, any general- 
ization.  These, of  course, are virtues  in  any  enquiry,  as Payne and 
Williams (2005: 304–5) outline in their critique of ‘generalisation issues’ in 
interpretivist sociology (e.g. ‘generalisation is more likely to be plausible 
if it is approached with caution, moderating the range of the generalising 
conclusions . . . generalisations are more credible if the exposition con- 
nects the generalisation to the specifics of data that provide  its founda- 
tion’). It is not claimed that these virtues are unique to multiple  method 
research. However, such research does provide opportunities  and make 
demands that encourage researchers to pursue them. Moreover, post- 
modernists will find  mixed method researchers engaging with  some of 
the same issues that postmodernism emphasizes. 
 
To look beyond the obvious is a mark of analytic density, as the cases 
following seek to show. Multiple method research is a world away from 
the paralysis of ‘epistemological relativism’, yet it does require a relativist 
element, so that it can sincerely engage with difference. Community  stan- 
dards of knowledge emerge from a practice of dialogic perspectivism, and 
triangulation  puts findings from different methods into dialogue. 
 
 
Analytic Density and Empirical Research 
 
 
Let us consider Erzberger’s (2000) account of the operation of the job place- 
ment scheme facilitating transitions of university graduates into employ- 
ment in former socialist East Germany. The scheme had been regarded as 
successful on the basis of patterns revealed by quantitative analysis of offi- 
cial labour market statistics. However, qualitative research suggested the 
system was being manipulated by job-seekers, who were finding their own 
work using informal channels, then colluding with employers to report a 
‘vacancy’ to the scheme, which was then quickly ‘filled’ by the collusive 
job-seeker, yielding an apparent success for the system. Does this example 
represent effective triangulation or mean we always need qualitative meth- 
ods, since the quantitative findings do not seem to have been accurate? 
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A complementarity case would be that, without the quantitative data 
providing one version  of job placements,  we would not know  how  to 
assess the reports from the qualitative study about the job-seekers manip- 
ulating the system. To see that the qualitative data raised a point worth 
pursuing, we had to have the quantitative data suggesting that the system 
was operating successfully. But even with both enumerative and interpre- 
tive data, doubt remains. Due to the generally limited samples in qualita- 
tive work, perhaps it simply uncovered those few renegade graduates who 
had manipulated the system. We could address that within the confines of 
a qualitative method by inspecting the data in which job-seekers reported 
satisfaction with the system. Perhaps manipulation was not the only inter- 
pretation. Alternatively,  we could  conduct a survey into precisely  how 
respondents learned of job vacancies. In this approach, initial quantitative 
data give an official version, this is questioned by qualitative findings, and 
we seek to relate the conflicting versions by highlighting the process sug- 
gested by the qualitative findings and testing whether it is generalizable. 
 
Where Kelle’s ‘theoretical’ element of triangulation  pertains is the 
observation that German reunification  prompted acute awareness of the 
manipulation  of official data by the former German Democratic Republic 
(GDR). The application of methodological triangulation is guided by 
theory – general suspicion of GDR information – without which there 
would be less  inclination to see the interview  data as challenging  the 
official employment statistics. Thus, the real value of triangulation is that 
its orientation to multiple perspectives helps researchers pursue a more 
critical stance towards their data. 
 
Such considered enquiries may appear unduly orchestrated, with 
researchers setting out to find things they are already committed to finding. 
However, the practices of research design, instrument design and sampling 
all involve looking ahead to what the findings might be and designing in 
ways of accommodating them. Awareness of multiple perspectives, empir- 
ical  indicators  and analytic  facets facilitates  this.  Having an informed 
appreciation of what may emerge is not the same as foreclosing the analy- 
sis. This approach promotes more complex research designs that enable 
researchers to be more clear about what their findings demonstrate and 
produce analyses that systematically indicate qualifiers and constraints on 
the relationships they reveal (see, for example, Deacon et al., 1998). 
 
A further  example of how triangulation  helps build  analytic density 
comes from work on gender and criminal victimization (Allen, 2001). Fear 
of crime is conventionally regarded as much lower in males than females 
but this may reflect inadequate methods and essentialist assumptions 
(Ditton, 2000). Many crime surveys combine percentages of those report- 
ing they are ‘very’  or ‘fairly  afraid’  and find  that the male response is 
much  lower,  concluding  that men are relatively  fearless about crime. 
 
 
 
 However, if we examine the ‘very’ afraid response, leaving out the ‘fairly’ 
category, which attracts a much larger percentage response from women 
than men for all crimes, the inaccuracy of male fearlessness is revealed. 
In light of this, Allen (2001) designed a survey questionnaire with  items 
that finely discriminated situations that were ‘very’  or ‘fairly’ anxiety- 
provoking.  The survey gauged levels of fear and secured an interview 
subsample. Interview  guides were tailored to each respondent based on 
their survey responses, focusing on the determinants of fear of crime they 
identified in the survey and asking respondents to expand on the expe- 
riences behind them. Striking  similarities  between male and female 
responses emerged. Respondents also  volunteered  second thoughts 
behind their survey ratings of risk, and questioned certain survey items. 
On this basis, Allen (2001) argues that fear of crime is not as gendered as 
was thought.  Here multiple  method  research provided  both  a richer 
understanding of gendered risk perception and substantial methodologi- 
cal refinement. Both the disaggregation of survey response sets and the 
attunement of risk scenarios to interview  response has been applied in 
subsequent risk  research and accord with  postmodernism’s  refusal  to 
privilege the researcher ’s perspective, treating research participants as co- 
enquirers into social phenomena. Latour (2000) observed that objectivity 
in research can be ‘to allow the object to object’. A very practical way of 
accommodating multiple  perspectives at the level of primary data collec- 
tion is to grant respondents maximum scope to reject the implications of 
researchers’ questions and put forward their own (Tanggaard, 2007). 
 
When we describe a research field as ‘mature’, we often mean that a 
substantive problem has been addressed by a variety of methods and the- 
oretical orientations. There will  be works that variously address the phe- 
nomenon’s historical, structural  and cultural  dimensions. An  adequate 
understanding  is  assumed to require attention to these several dimen- 
sions. This is a further point of connection with postmodernism. 
McRobbie (1994: 39) commends analytical work that is ‘structural, histor- 
ical and ethnographic’ and calls for an ‘integrative’ and ‘connective’ mode 
of analysis that draws on ethnography but also registers structure and 
social institutions.  For McRobbie (1994: 26), the most useful aspect of 
postmodernism is not its ‘anti-foundationalist philosophical concept 
whose basis lies in the disavowal of truth-seeking in intellectual inquiry’ 
but its recognition of ‘the new global and local social relations and identi- 
ties set up between individuals, groups and populations as they interact 
with  and are formed by the multiplicity of texts, images and representa- 
tions which are a constitutive  part of contemporary reality and experi- 
ence’ (McRobbie, 1994: 26). McRobbie makes the important  point for our 
argument here that its effect has been to shift fields like the study of the 
mass media  from  textual  analysis towards  a more holistic  frame that 
includes the ownership and control of communications media, and the 
cross-breeding of stylistic forms, as well  as attention to the underlying 
narratives borne by advertising and other cultural  products. She conse- 
quently calls for ‘a return to the phenomenological/empirical field (with 
all the complexity that this involves’) (McRobbie, 1994: 27). The fragmen- 
tation associated with  a decentring of consciousness is not read as dis- 
 abling enquiry  but as complicating  it. How  this works  in mainstream 
social science is apparent in a final example, from research on the career 
paths of female science graduates. 
 
A major puzzle in the gender gap in recruitment, retention and 
advancement in scientific occupations is the case of physics (see Glover, 
2000). Females have largely exceeded parity with males in undergraduate 
biology and biochemistry and are close to it in chemistry and mathemat- 
ics. While recruitment to first degrees and first destination employment 
has been getting more equitable in these disciplines, it seems that the 
modest increases in the proportion  of female physicists in the US and UK 
are accounted for by the subject’s declining attraction to men. Yet many 
more women are getting qualified  and working  in mathematics. Since 
physics is mathematically based, one might suppose that more women 
would enter physics. 
 
International comparison shows variations between countries with 
different economic circumstances and scientific establishments. Table 1, 
taken from Glover (2000), combines data from Dresselhaus et al. (1994) 
with a supplementary attrition  measure. 
 
While the US and UK show similar circumstances, Hungary, with  dif- 
ferent economic circumstances, has a high representation of women in 
first  degrees in  physics and academic employment.  Attrition between 
these two stages is also low. 
 
There are historical, structural and cultural explanations of the case of 
physics. Rossiter (1982) offered a structural analysis using historical data. 
In  the late  1930s, 30 percent of  women  scientists in  US government 
employment  were in biology,  and only  about 1 percent in physics. In 
research employment, 51 percent of women scientists were in biology, 
only 6 percent in physics. So there are long-standing differences in the 
‘quantitative feminization’ (Glover, 2000) of  scientific disciplines. 
Rossiter ’s explanation hinges on whether disciplines needed large num- 
bers of research associates for repetitive work like routine data process- 
ing, taxonomy and classification. She maintains that women were 
clustered into such work and were welcome in such capacities even in all- 
male universities. Sciences with high demand for classification work, like 
biology, biochemistry and chemistry, gained a cheap source of efficient, 
self-effacing labour. Physics did  not need this sort of work.  Only  the 
women’s  colleges offered  significant  opportunities.  But  such colleges 
lacked the facilities necessary for ‘big science’ and it was thus harder for 
women physicists to research the areas needed to access the discipline’s 
senior positions. Rossiter makes a historical case that the low representa- 
tion of women physicists has long-standing structural roots. This is plau- 
sible, but why are the patterns of the 1930s still with us? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 1    Cross-National Women’s Representation at Different Educational and 
Employment Levels in Physics, 1990 
 
 
 
Country 
(a) First 
degrees 
% 
 
(b) Doctorates 
% 
(c) Academic 
employment 
(%) 
Difference 
between 
(a) and (c) 
France 24 21 23 −1 
Hungary 50 27 47 −3 
Italy 29 21 23 −6 
US 15 9 3 −12 
UK 16 12 4 −12 
Source: Selected data from Megraw’s work cited in Dresselhaus et al. (1994). 
 
 
 
Table 1 suggests that countries where women’s attrition in physics is at 
its lowest are those with large public sectors. Countries with large physics 
establishments, high levels of industrial development and strong 
women’s movements had the lowest representation of women among 
physics faculty. Because explanation based on macro-level analysis could 
not address such patterns, the editors of Science conducted qualitative 
interviews with women scientists in countries having a high female rep- 
resentation in academic physics (Dresselhaus et al., 1994). These suggest 
that several explanations are necessary and that they relate to the charac- 
teristics of individual countries. For example, simply because Portuguese 
women accounted for 35 percent of physics faculty does not imply 
Portugal  is  an  exemplar  of  equal  opportunities  (Glover,  2000: 95). 
Portugal has a relatively  recent history  of institutional science. Newly 
industrialized countries offer more opportunities for women since 
science begins to be developed when women’s employment is already 
accepted. Further, the interviews suggested that in recently 
industrialized countries like  Portugal and Hungary,  academic physics 
is unpopular  with  men. During rapid industrialization, opportunities in 
business and industry are more appealing. Keeves and Kotte (1996) 
found that, in Hungary, boys were spurning physics in favour of 
potentially  more lucrative vocations. Such explanations are again 
plausible, but too narrow for some. 
 
Broader, postmodernist-oriented  explanations  suggest the problem  is 
the culture of physics. In Wertheim’s (1997) account, physics is a pseudore- 
ligious belief system akin to Catholicism. Both feature a male-only priest- 
hood that pursues a goal of ‘transcendent abstractions’. Wertheim believes 
the goals of physics must change and that women can do this because of 
their self-reflexivity, suggesting that women brought to biology a perspec- 
tive on evolutionary features emphasizing cooperation among organisms, 
not  antagonism.  However,  Wertheim  assumes these qualities  can be 
unproblematically imported to scientific disciplines. She also assumes sci- 
entific agendas are determined by scientists rather than material interests, 
and that women lack men’s hierarchical worldview. So her account begs a 
 lot of questions. But so do the other single-cause explanations. Subsequent 
research found that female scientists gained fewer than half the patents 
awarded to males, with interviewees reporting the lack of an ‘old girls 
network’.  The implication  of a confidence  factor led  the researchers  to 
reanalyse  their  panel  data for  inverse  probability  of treatment weight 
(Ding et al., 2006). This indicated that male scientists were apt to construe 
their  careers in commercial  terms, while  women,  as newer  entrants, 
remained satisfied with traditional constructions of academe as a vocation. 
The case suggests that we only get a rounded picture when we can draw 
on studies of the historical, structural and cultural dimensions, on studies 
founded on different theoretical precepts and employing different meth- 
ods. If these are virtues in respect of a field of enquiry, so must they be in 
respect of the individual research project. 
 
 
Postmodernism and Community  Knowledge 
 
 
This article has argued that postmodernism  is not all  methodological 
nihilism  and that, although postmodernist concerns were anticipated by 
more conventional social science perspectives, moderate versions orien- 
tate to empirically based knowledge that can contribute to sociology, par- 
ticularly through  postmodernism’s interest in multiple  perspectives. It 
has further  argued that, since triangulation  has moved away from con- 
vergent validation towards methodological combination for analytic 
richness,  and multiple  method research encourages testing of multiple 
perspectives and experiences, there is a connection between multiple 
method studies done within a conventional framework  and postmod- 
ernism’s interest in multiple  perspectives. A philosophical position that 
accommodates this approach is found  in  contemporary  hermeneutics, 
where no single account offers the whole ‘truth’  but each contributes 
additively  to a progressively richer understanding (Tate, 1998). 
 
Problematizing truth  and objectivity does not amount to rejecting the 
standard of truth or the attempt to be objective. Sociology cannot generally 
aspire to more than conclusions with identifiable and defined limits, 
implying the constant necessity for interpretation. This is the ultimate war- 
rant for multiple method work, and its connection with postmodernism. 
Taking a reflexive approach, engaging with the enigmatic, and alertness to 
facets of the phenomenon that can only be pursued with methods not 
already used, replicates in micro the process of debate and refinement of 
argument that enables  cumulative  knowledge  in research communities 
and is analogous to the local, community versions of knowledge to which 
moderate postmodernism subscribes. 
 
The desirability  of a middle ground is recognized even in applied 
research. Tilley (2000) advocates a process of ‘realistic evaluation’  that 
negotiates ‘that aspect of postmodernism which casts doubt on the possi- 
bility  of objective knowledge and . . . that aspect of modernism that prom- 
ises  universal  unconditional  truths’  (Tilley,  2000: 110). From  moderate 
postmodernism, McRobbie (1994: 184–5) calls for ‘a research mode which 
 prioritises multiple levels of experience, including the ongoing relations 
which connect everyday life with cultural forms. This would be a way of 
breaking down the division which has emerged between the study of cul- 
tural  texts and the study  of social  behaviour  and experience.’  Similarly 
McClellan (1992: 20) advocates a combination of elements of ‘Enlightenment 
sociology’ with postmodernist insights ‘to generate a series of productive 
and taxing tensions’, and Barrett (1992) looks to convergence to prompt in 
sociology a better understanding of subjectivity to inform  its customary 
perspective on social facts as things. 
 
Postmodernism’s  anti-essentialist stance towards,  for  example, the 
study of race or sexuality takes form in its concept of difference (e.g. there 
are many ways of being black), ‘but what is missing is a clear sense of 
what these different  identities look like, how they are lived and within 
what institutional frameworks they are pursued’ (McRobbie, 1994: 186). 
Thus, the concepts of difference and subjectivity that are so important  in 
postmodernism  await  methodological  means by  which  they  can be 
‘explored within the landscape of everyday social relations’ (McRobbie, 
1994: 185). Mixed methods research is implied by McRobbie’s method- 
ological imperative to evidence theoretical assertions that co-relate trends 
in phenomena like fashion and mores with analysis of the flow of capital 
between electronics and broadcast multinationals. 
 
The points of connection between triangulation and postmodernism sug- 
gest that the convergent validation approach to triangulation can seldom be 
wholly conclusive. Methodological combination cannot guarantee validity, 
but can provide a richer account. Neither postmodernism nor triangulation 
are as inflexible as their critics claim. Both contain an impetus for making con- 
nections and a potential to deliver rigour without rigidity. Finally, when we 
try to evaluate social science accounts we cannot simply do so on our own 
terms, or those of any single perspective. In our field, evaluation is by refer- 
ence to community standards rather than absolute standards. We will never 
enjoy what Needham (1983) called ‘the tranquillity of axiom’, but we can try 
to meet our pursuers without sawing off the branch we are sitting on. 
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